





Recent studies of African boundaries have tended to focus either on the
growing number of border disputes between states or on frontier regions
that are said to offer local inhabitants a wide range of economic oppor-
tunities. This article attempts to combine both approaches and to demon-
strate the ambiguous nature of the Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria
border. On the one hand, the border has been subject to regular skirmishes
between Cameroon and Nigeria, culminating in a protracted war over the
sovereignty of the Bakassi peninsula — an area rich in oil reserves. On the
other hand, it has for historical and economic reasons never constituted a
real barrier to cross-border movements of labour and goods. The large
Nigerian migrant community in Anglophone Cameroon, in particular, has
been able to benefit from formal and informal cross-border trade for a long
time. Unsurprisingly, its dominant position in the host community’s
commercial sector has been a continuous source of conflict.
OF LATE, AFRICANISTS HAVE DEVELOPED A RENEWED INTEREST in the study
of colonially negotiated borders,1 and the remarkable increase in boundary
disputes between and within African states has been the focus of several
recent studies. For a long time after independence border skirmishes and
wars between African states were relatively rare, and governments more or
less adhered to the sacrosanct nature of the boundaries inherited from
colonial times (the principle of uti possedetis jus), as laid down in the 1963
charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). At present, however,
African states are involved in numerous boundary disputes, such as those
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between Ethiopia and its neighbours in the Horn of Africa,2 between
Nigeria and its neighbours, and between the Democratic Republic of
Congo and its neighbours. According to Mbembe,3 most of these disputes
have their origins ‘not in the desire to make an ethno-cultural space
coincide with the space of the state, but rather in the struggle to control
resources considered to be vital’. Moreover, the recent political liberaliza-
tion process has created more space for separatist and irredentist move-
ments within African states, as evidenced in Senegal (Casamance), in
Cameroon (the Anglophone region), in Angola (the Cabinda enclave) and
in Namibia (the Caprivi Strip).4
Other studies focus on African border regions.They maintain that African
boundaries are essentially permeable, constituting no significant barrier to
the cross-border movement of labour and goods. They even claim that
African boundaries stimulate formal and informal cross-border trade, repre-
senting zones of opportunity for capital accumulation.5 Nonetheless, they
point out that relations between host and migrant communities in these
areas are seldom without conflict. Severe confrontations may even occur
when the ‘autochthonous’ or ‘national’ population sees ‘strangers’ and
‘foreigners’ as a threat in demographic, economic and political terms. Such
confrontations are often instigated or fanned by political entrepreneurs.6
This article focuses on the Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria boundary, a
study of which enables the two approaches outlined above to be combined.
On the one hand, this border has become a continuous bone of contention
between the Cameroonian and Nigerian states since soon after indepen-
dence. Regular border skirmishes raised international attention in the 1990s
when the two sides became involved in a protracted war over the sovereignty
of the Bakassi peninsula — an area rich in oil reserves. On the other hand,
this border has never hindered the large-scale circulation of people and
goods in the borderlands.The focus in the article is on the massive Nigerian
migrant community in Anglophone Cameroon and its exploitation of the
economic opportunities offered by its host region and cross-border trade.
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The article is divided into three sections. In the first section, I argue that
there was no real boundary between Anglophone Cameroon and Nigeria
during the British mandate and trust eras when Anglophone Cameroon was
administered as an integral part of Nigeria. This resulted in the large-scale
migration of Nigerians, in particular those originating from the densely
populated Igbo region, to Anglophone Cameroon. Due to their higher level
of education and business acumen, Igbo migrants soon came to dominate
the local public service and economy. It is beyond doubt that local resent-
ment of Igbo dominance, fuelled by Anglophone Cameroonian nationalist
leaders, was one of the principal reasons for the majority vote in the so-
called Southern Cameroons for reunification with Francophone Cameroon
rather than for integration into Nigeria during the 1961 plebiscite organ-
ized by the United Nations.
In the second section, I show that the reunification of Anglophone and
Francophone Cameroon created a real border between Anglophone
Cameroon and Nigeria, leading to a dramatic change in the identity and
economic opportunities of the Nigerian migrants. Henceforth, they were
not only transformed from citizens into foreigners but were also excluded
from a wide range of employment activities. Unexpectedly, these profound
changes have neither stopped nor reduced Nigerian migration. On the
contrary, the flow of Nigerians to Anglophone Cameroon even appears to
have increased. Nigerian migrants seem to be taking advantage of the
different monetary systems on both sides of the border and the extremely
favourable exchange rate of the CFA franc compared with the Nigerian
naira to specialize in formal and informal cross-border trade. Employing
their ethnic networks that stretch from Anglophone Cameroon to Nigeria,
they have acquired a dominant position and, in some cases, even a
monopoly in the Anglophone Cameroonian commercial sector. They have
also devised certain strategies to cope with repeated harassment by the local
authorities and the forces of law and order and with their status as a foreign,
but economically dominant, minority group in Anglophone Cameroonian
society.
In the third section, I first outline some of the underlying reasons for the
frequent border disputes between the Cameroonian and Nigerian states
since independence, culminating in the Bakassi conflict in the 1990s, and
then explore their impact on relations between the Anglophone Cameroon-
ian and Nigerian immigrant populations. Subsequently, I explain why the
2002 verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Bakassi
conflict in favour of Cameroon has been hotly contested by both the
Nigerian inhabitants of the Bakassi peninsula and Anglophone secession-
ist movements.
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The Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria boundary during the British mandate and
trust eras
Following the First World War, the erstwhile German Kamerun Protec-
torate (1884–1916) was partitioned between the British and French victors,
first as ‘mandates’ under the League of Nations and later as ‘trusts’ under
the United Nations. The British territory was much smaller than the
French, comprising about one-fifth of the total area and population of the
former German colony. It consisted of two narrow non-contiguous regions
bordering Nigeria and stretching from the Atlantic coast to Lake Chad.The
southern part, and the focus of this study, was christened Southern
Cameroons, and the northern part became known as Northern Cameroons.7
In sharp contrast to the French Cameroons which was incorporated into
the French colonial empire as a distinct administrative unit separate from
neighbouring French Equatorial Africa, the tiny British Cameroons was
governed as an integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. There was
every indication, particularly in the period preceding reunification, that
Britain intended to integrate it fully into Nigeria despite its distinct status
as a trust territory.8
The British method of administration had important consequences for
future political developments. First, it created the appearance that Nigeria,
rather than Britain, was the colonial power ruling the Southern Cameroons.
It was not, therefore, surprising that the nationalist struggles in the
Southern Cameroons after the Second World War had more an anti-Nigeria
than an anti-colonial character. Second, it gave rise to the increasing
peripheralization of the Southern Cameroons, becoming as it were a ‘colony
within a colony’ (Nigeria). Being administered as a mere appendage of
Nigeria, the Southern Cameroons was starved of development funds and
its economy remained centred on the plantations that had been established
under German rule.9 There was not even a separate budget for the Southern
Cameroons until 1954 when it achieved a quasi-regional status and a limited
degree of self-government.10 Third, and maybe even more significantly, it
abolished the existing border between the former German Kamerun Protec-
torate and Nigeria, resulting in the free movement of goods and labour. The
278 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
7. For the history of the Northern Cameroons, see, for instance, V. T. Le Vine, The
Cameroons: From mandate to independence (University of California Press, Berkeley/Los
Angeles, 1964) and C. E. Welch, Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and political unification in
West Africa (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1966). Northern Cameroons voted in the
1961 UN-organized plebiscite for integration into the Federation of Nigeria.
8. N. F. Awasom, ‘Colonial background to the development of autonomist tendencies in
Anglophone Cameroon, 1946–1961’, Journal of Third World Studies 15, 1 (1998), pp. 168–83.
9. E. Ardener, S. Ardener and W. A. Warmington, Plantation and Village in the Cameroons
(Oxford University Press, London, 1960); P. Konings, Labour Resistance in Cameroon (James
Currey, London, 1993).
10. Le Vine, The Cameroons, p. 201; T. E. Mbuagbaw, R. Brain and R. Palmer, A History of
the Cameroon (Longman, Harlow, 1987), pp. 86–7.
05 Konings adi004 (bc-s)  5/4/05  1:40 pm  Page 278
Southern Cameroons-Nigeria connection offered many economic and other
opportunities for the inhabitants of the frontier regions, albeit in varying
degrees.11
There is considerable evidence that eastern Nigerians benefited more
than Southern Cameroonians from the absence of any real border between
the two regions.12 There was a growing migration of eastern Nigerians, in
particular the Igbo, to the ‘greener pastures’ in Southern Cameroons.
Migration became instrumental in escaping from widespread land scarcity
in their densely populated areas and in providing the necessary manpower
and trading circuits in the underdeveloped Southern Cameroons, often
encouraged by the colonial authorities. Nigerian migrants could take
advantage of the higher level of education in their home region due to
earlier christianization.
Migrants started working in the various agro-industrial enterprises in the
Southern Cameroons, notably the Cameroon Development Corporation
(CDC), a huge parastatal, and Pamol, a subsidiary of Unilever, both of
which had inherited the former German plantations in the area.13 Since the
1940s there has been a spectacular increase in the Nigerian plantation
labour force. In the 1950s Nigerians, especially Igbo, comprised roughly
25–30 percent of the CDC labour force and 80 percent of the Pamol work-
force.14 Many of these workers settled in the Southern Cameroons. They
acquired land for food farming and cash cropping, originally on a usufruct
basis, by providing village elders with a token payment. Although the
transfer of land was not intended to be permanent, Nigerians were able,
with the increase in the value of land and the formalization of land tenure,
to secure titles and set themselves up as landlords.15
A growing number of them used their earnings from plantation labour to
launch small-scale trading enterprises, selling food and durable goods in the
vicinity of the plantations. Gradually, Igbo came to dominate the market
trade in local foodstuffs and imported goods, as well as the transport
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industry and the retail and wholesale distribution of palm oil in an area
centred on Kumba, Tiko and Victoria (Limbe). In these towns, large
numbers of Nigerians entered the restaurant business or became involved
in photography, baking, tailoring, shoemaking, bicycle repairs and a variety
of other small enterprises. In the Kumba area, they were the principal
buyers of cocoa, which in time became Southern Cameroons’ major export
crop.16 And, last but not least, their higher level of Western education
enabled them to occupy the majority of the white-collar supervisory and
managerial positions on the plantations and in the Southern Cameroons
civil service.
The dominant position of the Igbo in the regional economy and adminis-
tration was deeply resented by the local population, leading to an explosive
situation after the Second World War when regional politicians started
exploiting the ‘Igbo scare’ in nationalist struggles.17 As a result, Igbo
became the victims of verbal and physical attacks by frustrated local inhabi-
tants and were told to return home. They were accused, usually fancifully,
of every vice under the sun: bribery, corruption, narcotics, adulterating
palm wine and medicines, counterfeiting, theft, profiteering, seducing local
women, cannibalism, sorcery, disrespect of local customs and authorities,
and so on.18
It would appear that the Ardeners somewhat underestimated the degree
of Igbophobia among the Southern Cameroonian population and planta-
tion workers.19 For example, in February 1948, the Bakweri Native Author-
ity passed the following regulations with the aim of controlling relations
between the ‘autochthonous’ population and the Igbo: 
• Nobody is allowed to sell his or her house to an Igbo, neither may anybody give his
or her house for rentage to an Igbo.
• No farmland may be sold to an Igbo or rented to an Igbo.
• Nobody may allow an Igbo to enter any native farm or forest for purpose of finding
sticks for building or for any other purpose.
• Houses or farms already sold to an Igbo man shall be purchased by the Native
Authority, which will afterwards resell same to some suitable person.
• Nobody shall trade with Igbos for anything of value or not.
• All landlords must ask their Igbo tenants to quit before 15 March 1948.
• No Cameroonian woman is allowed to communicate with the Igbos in any form.20
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Similarly, during the 1947–60 period, Southern Cameroonian workers at
the CDC and Pamol undertook a series of informal and collective actions
aimed at removing Igbo and Ibibio supervisory and managerial staff.21
Compared to the massive Nigerian migration to the Southern Cameroons,
relatively few Southern Cameroonians found their way to Nigeria. They
were usually students, teachers, journalists, petty traders, businessmen or
employees in Nigerian firms. While they rarely rose to positions of influ-
ence in Nigeria, the Nigerian experience had a significant effect on the
emergence of Southern Cameroonian nationalism. Prominent Southern
Cameroonian nationalist leaders like Emmanuel Endeley, Paul Kale, John
Ngu Foncha, Nerius Mbile and Samson George received part or all of their
political education in Nigeria.22
Southern Cameroonian nationalists soon began to exploit the problems
caused by both the British Cameroons-Nigeria boundary and the British-
French Cameroons boundary. They attacked the subordinate position of
the Southern Cameroons in the British-Nigerian colonial system and the
dominant position of the Igbo in the Southern Cameroons. They initially
claimed a larger representation of the Southern Cameroonian elite in the
Nigerian administration and, later, regional autonomy. In response to their
pressure, the British authorities gradually increased Southern Cameroon-
ian representation in the Nigerian administration after the Second World
War; following successive constitutional changes, they granted the Southern
Cameroons a quasi-regional status and a limited degree of self-government
in 1954, and in 1958 full regional status within the Federation of Nigeria.23
For part of the Southern Cameroonian elite this was the reason to shift
from an anti-Nigerian stance towards a more positive view of Nigeria. From
their perspective, regional status seemed a satisfactory answer to the
problem of Nigerian domination, the lack of Southern Cameroonian
participation in the Nigerian political system, and economic stagnation.
Interestingly, from the late 1940s onwards the question of reunification
cropped up in the programmes of the various Southern Cameroonian
pressure groups and newly created parties, raising the possibility of an
alternative political option for the Southern Cameroons to escape from its
subordinate position in the colonial system and from Igbo domination. A
number of factors underpinned their reunification campaign.There was the
emergence of the ‘Kamerun idea’ among some members of the Southern
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Cameroonian elite — the belief that the period of German rule had created
a Cameroon identity or nation.24 Some authors have pointed out that this
idea hardly corresponded with reality, since German colonial rule had been
too short to create a Cameroonian identity among the multiplicity of ethnic
groups on its territory.25 Kofele-Kale, however, argued that it was not the
reality of the German experience but rather the memories (factual or
otherwise) or myths that inspired the Southern Cameroonian elite to start
advocating reunification.26 To strengthen their arguments, the elite often
referred to the close relationship that existed between ethnic groups on both
sides of the British-French Cameroons border. This boundary, they
stressed, was regarded as an unnecessary inconvenience by the frontier
people in the area because it restricted the free movement of people belong-
ing to the same ethnic group.
The idea of reunification appears to have been much more popular among
Francophones than among Anglophones.27 Its devoted and consistent flag-
bearers were loyalists of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), the
radical nationalist party in French Cameroon,28 and Francophone immi-
grants in the Southern Cameroons who saw reunification principally as a
way of eradicating discrimination by the British Administering Authority
and removing their second-class citizenship in the Southern Cameroons.29
Significantly, the Southern Cameroons elite largely regarded the reunifi-
cation idea in the first instance as an effective means of bringing pressure
to bear upon the British trusteeship administration to grant their territory
either a larger measure of autonomy within the Nigerian Federation or
separation from Nigeria altogether. Although the Southern Cameroonian
population ultimately voted by a majority of seven to three in favour of
union with the former French Cameroons during the 1961 plebiscite organ-
ized by the UN, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that if a third
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option of either independence or continued trusteeship had been put
forward, it would have been considered in a favourable light.30
Being deprived of this preferred option by the United Nations with the
complicity of the British, the Southern Cameroonian population was given
what amounted to Hobson’s choice: independence by joining Nigeria or
reunification with the then independent Republic of Cameroon. The
eventual vote in favour of reunification appeared to be more of a rejection
of continuous ties with Nigeria than a vote for union with Francophone
Cameroon. While most Southern Cameroonians dismissed outright inte-
gration into Nigeria because of the territory’s previous neglect and domi-
nation by the Igbo under Nigerian colonial administration, they were also
reluctant to join Francophone Cameroon, fearing that reunification might
result in domination by the Francophone majority and loss of their cultural
heritage and identity. In the end, the majority of Anglophones opted for the
lesser of the two evils because the ruling party in the Southern Cameroons,
the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), had assured them that
the constitutional provisions for a reunified Cameroon, namely, the creation
of a loose federation, would guarantee the equality of both partners and
the preservation of their cultural legacies.31
The Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria boundary after reunification
The reunification of Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon in 1961
created an international boundary between Anglophone Cameroon and
Nigeria. One of the immediate consequences of this was a dramatic change
in the legal status and economic opportunities of the substantial number
of Igbo and other Nigerian migrants residing in Anglophone Cameroon.32
Being redefined as de jure foreigners, Nigerian migrants no longer enjoyed
equal rights and opportunities as Anglophone Cameroonian citizens, which
seriously weakened their socio-political position in society. Even second- or
third-generation Nigerian migrants were now obliged to obtain a residence
permit, the cost of which had increased considerably over the course of
time. Official government charges rose from FCFA10,000 in the 1960s to
FCFA83,000 in 2002, but the actual costs were much higher since local
officials demand substantial bribes before they will issue a permit.33 Under-
standably, Nigerian migrants have been inclined to interpret this sharp rise
in price as one of the government’s ways of stopping the flow of migrants
from Nigeria to Cameroon and as a method of chasing out the existing
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Nigerian migrant community living in Cameroon. Indeed, a growing
number of them appear to be unable to meet the rising costs of a residence
permit. In a recent communiqué, Cameroonian immigration officers
claimed that less than 50 percent of Nigerian migrants are in possession of
the required documents.34 Inevitably, this has made them subject to
frequent police controls and extortion. They maintain, with some justifi-
cation, that they are more liable to police harassment and intimidation than
Cameroonians and that this is depriving them of their normal mobility. To
avoid such humiliating treatment, some have become engaged in either
producing fake documents or purchasing Cameroonian identity cards from
the relevant authorities.
At the economic level, the redefinition of Nigerians as foreigners has
meant a drastic reduction in previously available opportunities. The post-
reunification government has acted to restrict the activities of Nigerians in
a number of ways. They have been almost entirely phased out of state
corporations, including the huge agro-industrial parastatal, the CDC, and
the civil service, while private enterprises have been responding to govern-
ment pressure to ‘Cameroonize’ their labour force.35 State authorities have
also banned Nigerians from participating in certain lucrative trading activi-
ties, such as playing the role of middlemen in the cocoa trade or engaging
in the wholesale trade of palm oil, and from operating inter-urban taxis.
Faced with the gradual disappearance of such activities, the majority of
Nigerian migrants have begun to concentrate on trade and business in
Anglophone Cameroon. Since the mid-1960s, they have strengthened their
already dominant position in the commercial sector in the major towns of
Anglophone Cameroon: their share in this sector varies from 85 percent in
Tiko to 75 percent in Kumba and 70 percent in Mamfe and Victoria
(Limbe).36 They also dominate the fish industry: the majority of the fish
sold in Anglophone Cameroon are caught by Nigerians living in the
region’s coastal areas, including the Bakassi peninsula. Some Nigerians
have continued to excel in the production of foodstuffs and cash crops,
especially cocoa and coffee.
Remarkably, the introduction of an international boundary between
Anglophone Cameroon and Nigeria appears not to have reduced but
instead to have promoted the flow of labour and goods from Nigeria to
Anglophone Cameroon in spite of the change in the legal status and
employment opportunities of Nigerian migrants. The influx of Nigerians
has increased because of the favourable exchange rate between the naira
and the CFA franc: the coexistence of a fluctuating and a quasi-permanently
falling naira and a stable and convertible CFA franc has tended to stimulate
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Nigerians to work in Anglophone Cameroon and to engage in formal and
informal cross-border trading activities.37 The development of extensive
contraband activities was encouraged by the absence of efficient border
controls and the complicity of customs officers and other state authorities
in such lucrative activities.38 The smuggling of highly subsidized Nigerian
petrol (known as fédéral, funge or zoua-zoua in Cameroon) was undoubtedly
one of the most financially rewarding activities in the 1980s and the early
1990s.39
There appears to be a striking difference between Cameroonian citizens
and Nigerian migrants in the organization of formal and informal cross-
border trade. Cameroonians, like the entrepreneurial Bamileke, tend to
operate largely on an individual basis.40 In sharp contrast, Nigerians, and
particularly the Igbo, tend to cooperate along ethnic lines, making full use
of their extensive ethnic networks on both sides of the border. They group
together on a village or clan basis in order to control the entire trading circuit:
the provision, transportation, declaration,41 and distribution of goods.
Evidently, collective enterprise enables them to take advantage of economies
of scale, to incur lower costs than their Cameroonian counterparts, to set
competitive prices for their goods, and to dominate or monopolize the trade
in certain goods including cloth, cosmetics and pharmaceutical products,
spare parts for cars, ironware and household utensils.
Since reunification, Anglophone Cameroonians appear to have adopted
a rather ambivalent attitude towards the increased flow of Nigerian
migrants and their commercial success. On the one hand, they point to
their common colonial heritage and language and the existing ethnic ties
between some of the border peoples which have created a special bond
between Anglophone Cameroonians and Nigerians. As one of them said:
‘We are like brothers and sisters and are bound to live in peace and
harmony.’ Indeed, at the individual level, one can observe the development
of long-standing friendships and cordial relations. Members of both groups
often participate in the same institutions and associations such as churches
and social, sports and youth clubs, and they apparently mix well. Anglo-
phone Cameroonians also tend to acknowledge that the extensive Nigerian
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commercial presence gives them access to a large variety of goods at
competitive prices, which is obviously advantageous in the current situation
of economic crisis and low purchasing power.
On the other hand, Anglophone Cameroonians do not consider Nigeri-
ans as having equal rights in their country. Following the redefinition of
Nigerians as de jure foreigners after reunification, they feel empowered
towards the Nigerian minority, being convinced that, if necessary, Nigeri-
ans can always be brought into line by reminding them of their alien status
or by calling on the authorities.42 In response, Nigerians now usually prefer
to keep a lower profile in society than in the colonial era so as to avoid
attracting the attention of the local population and the authorities. Anglo-
phone Cameroonians also strongly resent the renewed Nigerian domi-
nation of the commercial sector in their region and envy their commercial
success, being in favour of an extension of the government’s policy of
Cameroonization into the commercial sector. This widespread resentment
was manifest in 1988 when the central market in Kumba, where approxi-
mately two-thirds of trading stalls are occupied by Nigerians, was twice set
on fire. Stereotypes of Nigerians and Igbophobia are commonplace.
Nigerians are still often looked upon as exploiters, crooks and sorcerers.
One of the glaring manifestations of persistent Igbophobia in Anglophone
Cameroon was the spreading of rumours and accusations in the 1990s of
Igbo involvement in the disappearance or theft of sex organs, sometimes
even leading to mob molestations of the accused.43
That such hostile feelings towards the Nigerian migrant community are
not simply motivated by ethno-regional sentiments towards an alien
community but rather by economic considerations, in particular resent-
ment of economic dominance, is clearly demonstrated by the attitude of
Anglophone Cameroonians towards the Igbo during the Nigerian civil war.
When the Igbo became involved in an armed struggle with the Gowon
regime for the establishment of an independent Biafran state, the outpour-
ing of public sympathy for their cause was surprisingly large in Anglophone
Cameroon. It is remarkable that the Anglophone Cameroonians who had
continued to revile Igbo domination in their midst now embraced their
cause, even when such support was against the official policy of the Ahidjo
government, which was unswervingly pro-Gowon. Undoubtedly, the plight
of the Igbo, their persecution under Hausa/Fulani hegemony, and their
pursuit of an independent state elicited powerful human feelings of brother-
hood among Anglophone Cameroonians who themselves had started to
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regret their reunification with the Francophone majority and their increas-
ing marginalization under another Fulani leader, Ahmadou Ahidjo.44
The press and the regime have often exhibited hostile sentiments towards
the Nigerian migrant community. They have claimed that the number of
Nigerian migrants amounts to 3 or 4 million — a figure that they consider
a threat to national security, when taking into account Cameroon’s total
population of an estimated 12 million.45 A more realistic figure for the
Nigerian migrant community is provided by some Cameroonian demogra-
phers with their estimate of about 1 million.46
The regime has exacerbated existing tensions in various ways. It is
inclined to indict Nigerian migrants as ‘economic saboteurs’ and ‘political
subversives’. During the economic crisis, it has frequently made the
Nigerian ‘exploiters’ scapegoats for the country’s economic ills. Since the
outbreak of the Bakassi conflict, it has attempted to turn the local popu-
lation against Nigerian ‘invaders’, despite the fact that Nigerian migrants
mostly refuse to express their opinions in public. Following the emergence
of the Anglophone secessionist movements in the 1990s, the regime has
often presented the Nigerian ‘Anglos’ as the ‘natural allies’ of the Anglo-
phone ‘Biafrans’.47 As a result, it has increased its intimidating and extor-
tionist tactics against the Nigerian migrant community. Nigerian migrants,
for their part, have displayed a large measure of flexibility and dynamism,
proving themselves capable of reacting rapidly and efficaciously to changes
in their economic and political environment.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Ahidjo regime took a number of steps
aimed at disrupting the Igbo framework of socio-political organization and
expressions of ethnic solidarity. Legislation was brought in that banned
ethnic organizations, including the powerful Igbo Union which functioned
as an exceptionally effective instrument in regulating the activities of its
members, undertaking self-help projects, and lobbying for Igbo interests
within the territory. The authorities also outlawed the celebration of Igbo
Day, an event that glorified the ethnic identity and achievements of the Igbo
people and inconvenienced Anglophone Cameroonians by bringing
commerce to a virtual standstill. Finally, the security forces demolished
Igbo Union Hall in Kumba, which had long served as a centre for Igbo
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activities — an action that Anglophone Cameroonians applauded as
symbolizing the dismantling of Igbo hegemony in their territory.48
Following the Biafran civil war, the Igbo increasingly joined the Nigerian
Union in Cameroon, which is legally recognized. This association does not
exist in Nigeria and can be regarded as a typical diaspora phenomenon.
The association has become a powerful pressure group in the defence of
Nigerian interests against the Cameroonian authorities,49 and it serves as
a vehicle for integrating Nigerians more fully into Anglophone Cameroon-
ian society. Conscious of the fact that local authorities are unlikely to resist
bribes, the ‘big men’ and elected chiefs among the Nigerian migrant
community are in the habit of offering them substantial amounts of money
to maintain mutual cordial relationships and to protect themselves and
other members of the migrant community against police harassment. Since
the introduction of multipartyism in the early 1990s, they also sponsor the
major parties during elections in order to gain their support once they are
in power. In the last instance, and having suffered severe maltreatment at
the hands of either the local population or the police, Nigerian migrants
have resorted to public protests such as demonstrations or closing their
businesses for a period.50
Confronted with an increasingly hostile political environment and a
dramatic change in economic opportunities in the wake of the 50 percent
devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, many Nigerian migrants have been
considering returning home. The precarious political and economic situ-
ation in Nigeria, however, has prevented most of them from doing so.
Instead they prefer to seek new ways to adjust to the changed conditions
in their host country and, if necessary, to rely on the traditional survival
strategies offered by the continued strong ethnic networks, solidarity and
mutual support among Nigerian migrants in Anglophone Cameroon.
The Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria boundary: contesting sovereignty over
Bakassi
The Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria border has been a regular source of
conflict between the Cameroonian and Nigerian states since reunifi-
cation.51 Similar to other colonially negotiated boundaries, this border, and
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especially the maritime border, has been neither entirely unambiguously
defined nor satisfactorily demarcated.52 Undoubtedly, sovereignty over the
Bakassi peninsula has been the major bone of contention in the long history
of Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria boundary disputes.
The Bakassi peninsula covers a territory of approximately 1,800 square
kilometres and is part of the Ndian Division of the South West Province in
Anglophone Cameroon. It is an underdeveloped and not easily accessible
area and can only be reached by boat. Moreover, cultivation is extremely
difficult because most of the area is marshy. The latest Cameroon census in
1987 estimated its population at 8,563; recent estimates, however, suggest
a considerably higher population of between 200,000 and 300,000.53
Although existing reports differ as to its population density, they all agree
that the vast majority are Nigerian, eking out an existence as fishermen.
Not unexpectedly, the peninsula also used to be a haven for informal cross-
border trade.
In the 1990s, the Bakassi peninsula suddenly became hot news in the
international media when the long-standing dispute between the Cameroon-
ian and Nigerian states over territorial sovereignty erupted into a war.
Remarkably, all the existing studies tend to focus solely on the two major
stakeholders in the conflict, the Cameroonian and Nigerian states, their
violent confrontations, and the subsequent international attempts at medi-
ation.54 They completely overlook the stakes of other parties in the conflict,
in particular the Nigerian migrant community and the Anglophone
Cameroon secessionist movements.
The two major stakeholders base their territorial claims on various argu-
ments; here only the most important ones are outlined. The territorial
claims of the Cameroonian state are largely founded on the Anglo-German
agreement of 11 March 1913, which defined the Bakassi peninsula as part
of the German Kamerun Protectorate. Cameroonian claims have been
given added weight by the 1975 Maroua Declaration signed by President
Ahidjo and General Gowon. This declaration, though never ratified by
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Nigeria, clearly recognized Cameroonian sovereignty over Bakassi.55
Moreover, there is ample evidence that there was a certain measure of
Nigerian acceptance of Cameroonian claims in the period preceding the
outbreak of violent conflict in the 1990s. In that period, various Nigerian
scholars and authorities publicly confirmed Cameroonian sovereignty over
the disputed territory, and Nigerian maps tended to locate the Bakassi
peninsula within Cameroonian territory.56
The territorial claims of the Nigerian state are based on historical
consolidation and the actual exercise of sovereignty after independence,
with the acquiescence of Cameroon.57 The Nigerian government has often
declared that subjects of the chiefs of Old Calabar have been occupying the
peninsula from pre-colonial times.58 It claims that, following independence,
these chiefs have transferred their title to the peninsula to the Nigerian state
which has exercised sovereignty over Bakassi ever since, without any sign
of protest from Cameroon. As proof of its postcolonial exercise of sover-
eignty, it refers to a number of practices on the peninsula, including the
collection of taxes, the widespread use of Nigerian currency, the possession
of Nigerian passports by Bakassi residents, and the presence of schools and
health centres subsidized by the Nigerian state.
From the mid-1960s onwards, the Joint Cameroon-Nigeria Border
Commission tried to help resolve the Bakassi conflict and other boundary
disputes, but very little was achieved. Agreements concluded by the two
governments were either contested or denounced outright and the failure
to resolve their border differences brought the two states to the brink of
war in 1981.59 Two factors appear to have hampered any peaceful solution.
The first factor was the frequent mutual mistrust shown by the leaders
of both states, going back to pre-reunification days. The territorial losses
suffered during the 1961 plebiscite in the British Cameroons created deep
and long-lasting bitterness in relations. Against the expectations of the
Francophone Cameroonian and Nigerian leaders, the Southern Cameroons
then voted for reunification with Francophone Cameroon, and the
Northern Cameroons for integration into Nigeria. Ahidjo, in particular, was
aggrieved by the loss of the British Northern Cameroons that was of the
same ethnic and religious extraction as his home region, the northern part
of Francophone Cameroon. Instead of strengthening his position, the
plebiscite results appeared to weaken it. He strongly suspected that the vote
of the Southern Cameroons for reunification would cement an alliance
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between the Southern Cameroonian elite and the ethnically related oppo-
sition in the southwestern part of Francophone Cameroon.60 He accused
the British-Nigerian colonial administration of having manipulated the
elections in the British Northern Cameroons to its own advantage and took
the matter to the International Court of Justice in The Hague and to the
United Nations, but lost his case. For several years, he declared the anni-
versary of that verdict a day of mourning, to the displeasure of Nigerian
leaders. Ahidjo was also reluctant to improve relations with his neighbour
because he was inclined to perceive the close cultural and historical connec-
tions between Nigeria and Anglophone Cameroon as a potential threat to
reunification and his pursuit of a strong central state and national unity.
He was particularly worried that the connection might encourage secession
among the Anglophone Cameroonian population, all the more so because
there was a growing dissatisfaction among the Anglophone minority with
the Francophone hegemonic tendencies following reunification.61
Nevertheless, Ahidjo’s support of the Gowon regime during the Biafran
civil war did bring about a temporary improvement in bilateral relations.
This led to an intensification of border talks, eventually resulting in the
1975 Maroua Declaration which delimited the maritime boundary between
Anglophone Cameroon and Nigeria and recognized Cameroonian sover-
eignty over Bakassi.62 The overthrow of the Gowon regime in a military
coup five weeks after concluding this accord was clearly connected with the
terms of this agreement, since the new military leader, Mohammed
Murtala, immediately blamed Gowon for allowing Nigerian territory to
pass to Cameroon and refused to ratify the agreement. This new stance
infuriated Ahidjo who accused Nigeria of acting in bad faith, and subse-
quently declined to enter into any further negotiations with the Nigerian
authorities as long as he remained the head of state of Cameroon. It is
reported that General Murtala ‘threatened that, rather than accept the
outrageous 1975 award, Nigeria would go to war if the Cameroonians
refused to negotiate’.63 Bilateral relations barely improved under Ahidjo’s
successor, Paul Biya, mainly because of continuing border problems.
A second, and even more important, factor that continued to thwart a
peaceful solution of the Bakassi conflict was the geo-strategic and economic
importance of the peninsula. Bakassi is not only of vital interest for control-
ling access to the port of Calabar, which is currently being developed as
Nigeria’s Export-Processing Zone and the Eastern Command Headquarters
of the Nigerian Navy, but it also has rich hydrocarbon and fish resources.64
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After the repeated failures to resolve the Bakassi conflict peacefully, the
Nigerian government eventually sought a military solution. In the early
1990s, the Nigerian army had already undertaken a few temporary infil-
trations into the Bakassi peninsula,65 but on 21 December 1993 it occupied
some parts under the pretext of protecting the Nigerian population from
harassment and maltreatment at the hands of the Cameroonian
gendarmerie.66 In reaction, Cameroonian troops attacked the Nigerian
occupation force, which resulted in several deaths and large-scale destruc-
tion of property. The fighting continued intermittently as both sides
increased the quantity and quality of their weapons in the disputed zone.
Ngniman made a detailed report of all the military events that took place
between 1993 and 1996.67 In February 1996, the Nigerian occupation
forces clashed again with Cameroonian troops.
A number of initiatives were taken to prevent the dispute from escalat-
ing and to bring both parties to the negotiating table, including pressure
from France motivated by its determination to safeguard its various inter-
ests in both states,68 mediation by the Togolese President Eyadéma, and
the adoption of resolutions by the United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity, apparently with little success. On 29 March 1994, the
Cameroonian government filed an application with the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague instituting proceedings against Nigeria for
violently contesting Cameroon’s sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula. It
was not until 10 October 2002 that the court ruled in favour of Cameroon,
ordering Nigeria to withdraw expeditiously and without condition its
administration and its armed forces and police from the peninsula.69 The
court, however, reminded the Cameroonian government of its pledge at the
hearings that it would ‘continue to afford protection to Nigerians living on
the Bakassi peninsula’. It also rejected Cameroon’s request that Nigeria be
held responsible for the damage caused by its occupation of Bakassi.
On 5 September 2002, just a month before the court’s verdict, the UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan had met the two heads of state, Olusegun
Obasanjo and Paul Biya, in Paris in the presence of the French President
Jacques Chirac. On that occasion, the two African leaders pledged to
comply with the court’s verdict, irrespective of its ruling. After the
announcement of the verdict, however, Nigeria initially appeared to reject
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the ICJ’s ruling. It was even reported that it was deploying more troops to
Bakassi and taking a head count of Nigerian indigenes on the peninsula.70
Concerned about these developments, the UN Secretary-General inter-
vened again, inviting the two leaders to a meeting in Geneva on 15
November 2002 to work out how to comply peacefully with the ICJ verdict.
This intervention led to the revival of the Joint Cameroon-Nigeria Border
Commission. In a communiqué issued after the summit, it was specifically
stated that this commission ‘would consider all the implications of the ICJ
verdict, including the need to protect the rights of the affected population
in both countries’.71 The commission would, among other things, be
entrusted with the task of demarcating the land and maritime boundaries
between the two countries. It would also make recommendations on
additional confidence-building measures such as the holding of regular
meetings between local authorities, government officials and heads of state,
and devising projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border
cooperation, to forestall inflammatory statements or declarations on Bakassi
by either side, and to encourage troop withdrawals and the eventual demili-
tarization of the peninsula.
Since this time, the commission has been meeting every two months in
the capitals of both states. After a difficult start, progress has been made,
including Nigeria’s offer to construct a cross-border road connecting Ikom
and Mamfe, and the implementation of the demarcation of the boundary.
One of the issues that impeded a major breakthrough was the Nigerian
refusal to withdraw troops from Bakassi until the protection of the legiti-
mate rights of the Nigerian population on the peninsula was ensured.
Cameroon, however, proved unwilling to accord Nigerian residents in the
area special privileges or status.72 By the end of 2003, Nigeria announced
that it was finally prepared to hand over the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon
in May 2004, but negotiations on the position of Nigerian residents follow-
ing the transfer are still ongoing.73
Understandably, Nigerian migrants in Anglophone Cameroon have been
reluctant to voice their opinion about the ICJ verdict in favour of
Cameroon. In a sense, they have even appeared to be happy with the
decision, since the Bakassi conflict had tended to intensify anti-Nigerian
sentiments among the local population and incite police harassment. Given
the deterioration in mutual relations during the conflict, leaders of the
Nigerian Union had made several representations to the local authorities
to express their concern about the war between the two countries, their
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commitment to a peaceful solution to the conflict and especially their desire
to live in peace with Cameroonians.74
In sharp contrast to other Nigerian migrants in Anglophone Cameroon,
Nigerian residents in Bakassi were not afraid to express their support for
the Nigerian army’s occupation of the peninsula, and strongly contested
the ICJ verdict. On various occasions, their political leaders and traditional
rulers have called upon the Nigerian government to maintain control over
Bakassi. They even threatened to secede from Nigeria and create an inde-
pendent Bakassi state, should the Nigerian government fail to protect their
interests.75 For example, in November 2003, Mr Joe Atene, the Bakassi
representative in the Cross River State House of Assembly, publicly
declared that the Nigerian residents of Bakassi would regard a unilateral
handing over of the peninsula by the Nigerian government to Cameroon
as a serious betrayal:76
We have always been Nigerians, and if Nigeria now decides to turn its back to us, we
may not have any other option than to pursue self-determination. We will not be part
of Cameroon.
There appear to be several reasons for their fierce resistance to Nigeria’s
handing over of Bakassi to Cameroon. First, they firmly believe that such
a transfer would imply ‘complete neglect and abandonment’ of the penin-
sula, pointing out that Nigeria rather than Cameroon has been making a
significant contribution to territorial development.77 Second, they are not
prepared ‘to subject themselves to the bondage of Cameroonian
gendarmes’.78 And, above all, they claim ownership of the Bakassi lands —
a claim strongly rejected by the Cameroonian residents. For instance, the
leader of the Bakassi Indigenes Development and Cultural Association
(BIDCA) stressed, following the ICJ verdict, that even the first Nigerian
settlers recognized and respected autochthonous control over Bakassi
lands:79
Ntun-Umor and Prince Asibong (Archibong), being the first settlers representing the
present Akwa Ibom and Cross River States in Nigeria respectively, consulted our
founding fathers at Isangele town and undertook a blood-oath before being allowed
to settle.
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Following the Nigerian government’s recent decision to hand over Bakassi
in May 2004, President Obasanjo cautioned the Nigerian Bakassi
community that he would not tolerate any separatist tendencies.80
The ICJ verdict has also been fiercely contested by the various Anglo-
phone movements that emerged during the political liberalization process
in Cameroon in the early 1990s.81 They claim that the nation-state project
following reunification has been driven by the firm determination of the
Francophone elite to dominate the Anglophone minority in the post-
colonial state and to erase all cultural and institutional foundations of
Anglophone identity. Most of them initially strove for a return to a federal
state, but later, following the Biya government’s persistent refusal to enter
into any meaningful negotiations, they came to champion the creation of
an independent Anglophone state. They have provocatively re-introduced
the name of Southern Cameroons to refer to the Anglophone territory so
as to ‘make it clear that our struggles are neither of an essentially linguis-
tic character nor in defence of an alien colonial culture . . . but are aimed
at the restoration of the autonomy of the former Southern Cameroons
which has been annexed by the Republic of Cameroon’.82 The umbrella
organization of all the Anglophone movements was subsequently named
the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). Since the violent
confrontations between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula,
the SCNC has constantly emphasized that Bakassi is neither a part of
Cameroon nor of Nigeria but instead belongs to the Southern Cameroons.
The decision of the Cameroonian and Nigerian governments to submit
their dispute over the Bakassi peninsula to the International Court of
Justice for adjudication in 1994 offered Anglophone nationalists an oppor-
tunity to access legal space.83 In 2001, the newly founded Ex-British
Southern Cameroons Provisional Administration created a new body, the
Southern Cameroons People’s Organization (SCAPO), for the specific
purpose of pursuing all legal avenues to achieve the independence of the
Southern Cameroons. In its legal struggles for the recognition of an inde-
pendent Southern Cameroons state, SCAPO rapidly filed a lawsuit against
the Nigerian government in the Nigerian Federal High Court in Abuja. It
had two reasons for taking Nigeria to court. First, the trust territory of
Southern Cameroons had been administered by Britain as an integral part
of Nigeria; consequently, SCAPO was inclined to regard Nigeria as a co-
conspirator with Britain in the process that led to the annexation of the
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Southern Cameroons by La République du Cameroun.84 Second, Nigeria
had ratified the OAU Banjul Charter of Human Rights that lays down in
Article 20 the right of all colonized or oppressed peoples to free themselves
from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the
international community.
In this historic case, the plaintiffs sought the following relief from the
Nigerian Federal High Court: 
• an order compelling the Nigerian government to place before the ICJ
and the UN General Assembly, and ensure diligent prosecution to
conclusion, the claim of the peoples of Southern Cameroons to self-
determination and their declaration of independence; and
• a perpetual injunction, restraining the Nigerian government from treating
the Southern Cameroons and all the peoples of the territory as an
integral part of La République du Cameroun.
In the end, SCAPO scored a landmark victory when, in March 2002, the
Nigerian Federal High Court ruled in its favour on both issues. The court
ordered the Nigerian government to submit to the ICJ the question of
whether it was the Southern Cameroons and not La République du
Cameroun that ought to share a maritime boundary with the Federal
Republic of Nigeria.85 Clearly, the implication is that the ICJ cannot adju-
dicate in the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi
peninsula without first clarifying the international status of the Southern
Cameroons. It is only after such a clarification that a decision can be made
about sovereignty over Bakassi. Regrettably, despite numerous requests by
Anglophone secessionist movements, this clarification has not yet materi-
alized. The Nigerian government has not been prepared to execute the
Federal High Court’s judgment nor has the ICJ been ready to suspend
proceedings in the Bakassi case pending determination of the international
status of the Southern Cameroons.
It is interesting to observe that the Anglophone leadership, which in the
past strongly condemned Nigerian domination of the Southern Cameroons,
is tending to support Nigerian opposition to the ICJ verdict. Following
press reports that the UN Secretary-General was about to discuss the ICJ
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decisions with the heads of state of Cameroon and Nigeria in Geneva,
the chairman of the SCNC and chancellor of the Ex-British Southern
Cameroons Provisional Administration wrote to him on 12 November
2002 as follows:86
While we share your anxiety for good neighbourliness between Nigeria and La
République du Cameroun, the people of the Southern Cameroons, under the banner of
the SCNC, wish to make their stand on the disputed territory abundantly clear. . . .
Our problem is undoubtedly that of preference for the Federal Republic of Nigeria
to continue to retain the Bakassi Peninsula until the State of the Southern Cameroons
shall be restored. Then we shall ourselves negotiate the retrieval of Bakassi from the
hands of Nigeria, in a process we believe shall be very friendly and easy as not to
require arbitration.We share a common Anglo-Saxon political culture with Nigeria by
virtue of having been governed by Great Britain together as a single entity for half a
century. . . . On the other hand, the people of the Southern Cameroons do not want
La République du Cameroun to lay hands on our Bakassi inheritance.
Since the establishment of the Joint Cameroon-Nigeria Border
Commission, the leadership of the Anglophone secessionist movements has
made it clear on a regular basis that the independent state of Southern
Cameroons will not be bound by any agreements reached by the two states
on the maritime border that have ignored the state of Southern Cameroons
and its people.87 It has also petitioned the United Nations and influential
diplomatic missions in the country against its exclusion from the
commission.
Conclusion
Unlike most previous research on African boundaries, this study of the
Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria border focuses on both state and local
levels. This approach has made it possible not only to highlight the mutual
influence of these two levels on socio-economic and political relations in
the Anglophone Cameroon border zone but also to demonstrate the
ambiguous nature of the boundary itself. Such an ambiguity appears to be
characteristic of other African boundaries as well, making them potentially
fascinating areas of research.88
On the one hand, the Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria border has served
as a zone of opportunities for many years, posing no real barrier to the
cross-border movement of goods and people. For historical and economic
reasons, Anglophone Cameroon has attracted an increasing flow of Nigerian
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migrants, in particular Igbos. Having been largely excluded from other
economic activities in the post-reunification era, these migrants have
concentrated on the potentially lucrative formal and informal cross-border
trade. Capitalizing on their close ethnic networks on both sides of the
border, they have achieved a dominant position in Anglophone Cameroon’s
commercial sector.
The Anglophone Cameroon-Nigeria boundary has, on the other hand,
served equally as a source of conflict. First, there have been persistent
tensions between the host community and the large Nigerian migrant
community. The Anglophone Cameroonian population has always strongly
resented Nigerian dominance of local trading circuits, which has led to
various forms of Igbophobia and humiliating police harassment. The
political elite and local government authorities have fuelled local hostile
sentiments for their own ends, such as their attempt to shift responsibility
for the present economic and political crisis to Nigerian exploitative and
subversive activities. They have even not hesitated to extort huge sums of
money from the alien minority group. Tensions between the host and
migrant communities have tended to be aggravated when there was a crisis
in bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria, such as in the case of
grave border disputes. Second, there have been frequent conflicts between
the Cameroonian and Nigerian states about the colonially negotiated
boundary, culminating in the war over the sovereignty of the oil-rich
Bakassi peninsula in the 1990s. The ICJ’s verdict in favour of Cameroon
has been vehemently contested by the Anglophone secessionist movements,
and by the Nigerian residents of Bakassi who make up the vast majority of
the peninsula’s population. Both claim, for various reasons, ownership of
Bakassi.
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